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“SHaPeS of Grief”: HamLEt’S Grammar ScHool 
PaSSionS
by roSS knecHT 
my Grammar, i define to be an art,
Which teacheth me to write and speak my heart
—christopher Harvey, Schola cordis
ye know not, what hurt ye do to learning, that care not for wordes, 
but for matter, and so make a deuorse betwixt the tong and the hart.
—roger ascham, the Scholemaster
readers of William Shakespeare’s Hamlet have for some time 
observed “the intensely critical, almost disillusionist, attitude of the play 
towards language itself.”1 This is especially true of the play’s protagonist, 
who, in his professed clumsiness with poetic “numbers” and his impa-
tience with the tedium of “words, words, words,” adopts a traditional 
anti-rhetorical position, a dismissal of the outward qualities of language 
in favor of the things they strive to represent but often only obscure.2 
The position draws on the longstanding opposition between words and 
things, a dichotomy frequently raised in early modern discourse on 
grammar and pedagogy. erasmus addresses the distinction between 
verba and res in De ratione studii (1521), associating the former with 
the basic pedagogy of the grammar schools and the latter with university 
level study.3 early comedies like Love’s Labour’s Lost and the merry 
Wives of Windsor—in their adolescent eroticism, delight in wordplay, 
and frequent allusions to latin pedagogy—may be said to belong to 
the world of verba and the grammar schools. Hamlet, however, is a 
Shakespearean hero who is at home not in the grammar school like the 
lovers of the comedies but in the rarefied realm of university discourse, 
here denoted by the image of Wittenberg. Hamlet is an intellectual 
who has ascended beyond the matter of the trivium: already a master 
of verba, he desires to grapple with res.
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The play itself, however, draws attention to its own artifice, its own 
verbal constitution, through its insistent metatheatricality, undermining 
its protagonist’s campaign against the limits of language. Thus while 
Hamlet the character is intent on transcending linguistic representa-
tion, Hamlet the play revels in it, ostentatiously parading its status as 
an edifice of “mere words.”4 The tension between Hamlet’s desire for 
unmediated access to things and the play’s linguistic self-consciousness 
has been insightfully explored by such critics as richard Waswo, robert 
Weimann, and bruce Danner.5 but a crucial area of this conflict has 
so far escaped notice. Hamlet’s desire to transcend language is most 
clearly represented by his attempts to adumbrate an interiority that lies 
beyond the power of verbal signification. it is in his inward passions, 
those privately held feelings and impressions that he struggles to 
translate into outward action, that Hamlet locates a realm beyond 
language, as we see in his insistence that “i have not art to reckon 
my groans” (2.2.120). but the very opposition of passion and action 
that defines this ineffable inwardness is derived from the structure of 
language, and the terms used to explore it borrowed from the discourse 
of grammar. The clearest evidence of this debt to grammar appears in 
Hamlet’s “To be or not to be” speech. in this famous meditation on 
being, this deliberation on whether it is better “to suffer” or “to stand 
against a sea of troubles,” the text employs a set of terms and verbal 
configurations that Shakespeare would have learned not from reading 
michel de montaigne or some other philosopher, but from the lessons 
of the grammar school (3.1.57–59): “The infinitive signifieth to do, to 
suffer, or to be.”6 Thus we find in Hamlet an important connection 
between the culture of the grammar school represented in the early 
comedies, and the drive towards the ineffable that has since its own 
time established the play as a work “to please the wiser sort.”7 and it 
is precisely at those moments when the text strives to indicate a realm 
beyond language that the debt to grammar becomes most apparent.
Sarah beckwith’s recent study, “Shakespeare and the Grammar of 
forgiveness,” offers an artful and perceptive reading of Shakespeare’s 
late drama, arguing that while tragedies such as Hamlet bear witness 
to the destructive consequences of “a split between a self that ‘passeth 
show’ and a face and body that can only betray a mind too lonely and 
inaccessible to be expressed,” the later plays heal this rift by cultivating 
a language of forgiveness, pioneering what beckwith calls a “theater 
of embodiment” in the union between inward being and outward 
expression. beckwith’s “grammatical investigation,” which draws upon 
the philosophy of ludwig Wittgenstein and Stanley cavell, entails an 
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understanding of “language as act, as event in the world, and so asks 
us to extend our conception of the work of language beyond the work 
of representation.”8 With this principle in mind, Hamlet’s claim that 
he has “that within which passes show” becomes something more than 
a mere gesture towards an interior space (1.2.85): it is a demand for 
acknowledgment, an appeal to sympathy, a subtle chastisement of the 
heartless world around him. as such, his words are not inadequate, 
as they paradoxically claim: they exert a profound influence upon the 
world of the play and manifest Hamlet’s own being in that world. as 
cavell writes, archly framing his comments as advice to Hamlet himself, 
“To let yourself matter is . . . to acknowledge that your expressions in 
fact express you, that they are yours, that you are in them. This means 
allowing yourself to be comprehended, something you can always deny. 
not to deny it is, i would like to say, to acknowledge your body, and 
the body of your expressions, to be yours, you on earth, all that will 
ever be of you.”9
beckwith’s reading of Shakespeare unfolds within the context of the 
reformation, in the wake of the traumatic interruption of the rituals 
and practices that for centuries gave form and meaning to the lives of 
the medieval english. of particular significance is the loss of the sacra-
ment of penance, which according to beckwith served a central role 
in establishing and maintaining communal relationships. Shakespeare’s 
late drama works to remedy this loss by developing a new language of 
acknowledgment and reconciliation, a “grammar of forgiveness,” within 
the secular arena of the theater. The present essay provides a different 
historical and institutional context for a Wittgensteinian reading of 
Hamlet by demonstrating the play’s engagement with the pedagogical 
and rhetorical culture of its age. Hamlet emerges from a Humanist 
culture steeped in grammar and rhetoric, a culture that understands 
human action and experience through the frame of the language arts. 
it reaches the stage at a time when this rhetorical culture is being 
challenged by empirically minded critics such as francis bacon, for 
whom the autonomy of language that prevailed under Humanism was 
a “distemper of learning, when men study words and not matter.”10 
although the play is marked by this new distrust of the primacy of 
language, it is nonetheless a product of a Humanist education and 
habitually recurs to the discourse of the language arts, even in its 
attempts to evoke an extra-linguistic interiority.11 i am convinced by 
beckwith’s argument that we are still too quick to take Hamlet at his 
word when he claims a self beyond the scope of words.12 in celebrating 
an inner being that purports to lie outside the text, we neglect the 
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play itself, privileging a self-abnegating metaphysics over the forms of 
life so vividly realized in its language. We also fail to see that Hamlet’s 
claims of a private and ineffable interiority are themselves verbal acts, 
rhetorical gestures that operate within a particular tradition and abide 
by the rules of a particular grammar.
The key term in my analysis is “grammar,” which i use in a way that 
seeks to reconcile the Wittgensteinian sense with the understanding 
of grammar cultivated by the Humanist educational practices of the 
sixteenth century. for Wittgenstein, grammar comprises the fluid set 
of rules and conventions that guide and give meaning to any language, 
practice, or performance. language in Wittgenstein is not a static 
system of reference, but an ongoing, ever changing activity, an ensemble 
of language games performed in specific situations for specific purposes. 
The meaning of language is established not by correspondence with 
some external or internal object of reference, but rather by its use, 
by its effective engagement with the world. Grammar, which provides 
the rules for our language games, grants meaning to language insofar 
that it tells us how language is used. 
a different, but similarly broad, definition of grammar obtained 
in the early modern period. Grammar then was not simply a set of 
syntactic rules, but a liberal art, the primary and most pervasive of 
the trivia: in the words of brian cummings, it was “the ars before 
and within every other ars.”13 as the ground of education and one of 
the most basic practices of acculturation and socialization, grammar 
provided for the early moderns a framework for understanding human 
experience. Thus early modern writers could speak in terms that 
anticipate Wittgenstein of “the grammar of the heart,” or “the grammar 
rules of affection.”14 Such echoes of grammar school discourse, which 
appear frequently throughout early modern literature, suggest the inter-
dependence of internal states and outward expressions, the “radical, 
fundamental harmony of word and world” proposed by Wittgenstein.15 
in addition to the Wittgensteinian readings of beckwith and David 
Schalkwyk, my argument here builds upon the recent historiography 
of the grammar school by such critics as cummings, lynn enterline, 
lynne magnusson, Jonathan Hope, and Jeff Dolven.16 This impor-
tant scholarship has begun to demonstrate the pervasive influence of 
pedagogy on early modern writing, not only in providing necessary 
literary and rhetorical training, but in establishing the conditions for 
“the convincing effects of character and emotion” for which writers 
like Shakespeare are celebrated.17
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i. THe DeclenSion of melancHoly
outside the character of Hamlet himself, the world of Hamlet is one 
in which, to quote anne ferry’s characterization of the renaissance, 
“man’s inward and outward experiences [are] viewed as closely parallel 
. . . no great separation [is] consistently conceived to exist between 
them.”18 We do not get the sense from most of the characters in the 
play that there is an unbridgeable gulf between outward expression 
and inward states, between words and behaviors and that which they 
may signify. When Hamlet’s inscrutable conduct confounds the court, 
claudius does not attribute their confusion to a discrepancy between 
Hamlet’s outward behavior and his inward thoughts; instead, he assumes 
the two to be transformed in concert: “nor th’exterior nor the inward 
man / resembles what it was” (2.2.6–7). even claudius’s private confes-
sion that “Words without thoughts never to heaven go” suggests not 
an absolute distinction between words and their meanings, but rather 
the insufficiency of his own performance of repentance, as he has not 
renounced the prizes won by his treachery (3.3.98):
That cannot be, since i am still possess’d
of those effects for which i did the murder—
my crown, mine own ambition, and my queen.
may one be pardoned and retain the offence? 
          (3.3.53–56)
What claudius’s words lack, then, are practical actions: the abdication 
and confession that would constitute genuine repentance. His words 
fail not because they lack some inward or outward object of refer-
ence, but because they are pronounced apart from the context and 
circumstances necessary for the practice of repentance.
We can see the harmony of inward and outward states with particular 
clarity in Polonius’s account of what he takes to be Hamlet’s pining for 
ophelia. This is of course a misdiagnosis: what he believes to be love 
melancholy is in fact the half-feigned madness brought on by Hamlet’s 
encounter with the ghost. nevertheless, the lines demonstrate the way 
that affective states such as melancholy are understood to be manifest 
in their expression. Polonius explains that upon being rebuffed in his 
advances towards ophelia, Hamlet
fell into a sadness, then into a fast,
Thence to a watch, thence into a weakness,
Thence to a lightness, and, by this declension,
into the madness wherein now he raves
and all we mourn for. 
         (2.2.147–51)
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Hamlet’s melancholy advances through a series of stages in a familiar 
and recognizable pattern: first sadness, then lack of appetite and sleep-
lessness, then fatigue and light-headedness, and finally madness. its 
beginning is disappointment in love; its end, insanity. i want to place 
particular emphasis on the use of the term “declension” to describe 
this sequential pattern. “Declension” is a technical term in grammar, 
referring to the successive forms of an inflected noun, pronoun, or 
adjective. in addition to this specialized definition, the OED lists the 
more general senses of a “deviation or declining from a standard, 
falling away,” and “sinking into a lower or inferior condition,” citing the 
speech of Polonius and lines from Richard III (we might add a similar 
usage in Henry IV, Part two).19 certainly there is the suggestion of 
“decline” in the passage, for Hamlet’s state progressively deteriorates 
in Polonius’s account. but the only other contemporary uses of this 
wider sense come from Shakespeare himself: all other instances of the 
term cited by the OED prior to 1660 are confined to the technical 
discourse of grammar. it seems safe to assume, then, that the lines are 
intended to recall the grammatical sense of “declension,” associating the 
progressive stages of Hamlet’s melancholy with the forms of the latin 
noun. There are, we should note, six stages demarcated in Polonius’s 
speech, and there are six cases of latin nouns observed in the Tudor 
grammar school.20 but why use a grammatical term here? What does 
grammar have to do with an affective condition such as melancholy?
in one of the more cryptic aphorisms of the Philosophical 
Investigations, Wittgenstein writes that “Grammar tells us what kind of 
object anything is.”21 for Wittgenstein, as i have suggested, “grammar” 
names the set of rules and conventions that guide the use of language. 
Since the meaning of a word in Wittgenstein is derived from its use 
rather than from its object of reference, the rules that guide the use 
of a word also establish its meaning. Grammar provides the necessary 
conditions under which an object may be publically recognized and 
understood.
Grammar is no less fundamental to the phenomena of inner life than 
to any other object, for “an ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward 
criteria.”22 We are accustomed to thinking of the phenomena of inward 
life as existing prior to their expression in language: we imagine that 
we feel some pain or desire, and subsequently use a word to name 
that feeling. Wittgenstein inverts this process, arguing that we first 
learn how to speak of pain and desire from the world around us, and 
then accommodate this way of speaking to our own inward states. 
as Schalkwyk writes, “the language of inwardness is constituted by 
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public life. The meanings of the words used of inward states are not 
those states themselves, but rather publicly derived rules and uses.”23 
in a well-known discussion that has come to be known as the private 
language argument, Wittgenstein contends that for a language to 
be meaningful, it must be conform to standards of correct usage, a 
publically sanctioned “grammar.” a private language, in which words 
“refer to what only the speaker can know—to his immediate private 
sensations,” lacks such a grammar and consequently cannot function:
but what does it mean to say that he has ‘named his pain’?—How has 
he managed this naming of pain? and whatever he did, what was its 
purpose?—When one says ‘He gave his name to his sensation’, one 
forgets that much must be prepared in the language for mere naming 
to make sense. and if we speak of someone’s giving a name to a pain, 
the grammar of the word ‘pain’ is what has been prepared here; it 
indicates the post where the new word is stationed.24
To speak of pain we must first understand the grammar of pain: the 
words and constructions we use to speak of pain, the situations in 
which it makes sense to have pain, the proper responses to another’s 
pain (such as sympathy and pity), and so on. even what may appear 
to be a private, inward sensation such as pain requires a particular 
grammar by which it may be publically known.
i want to suggest that Polonius’s declension of melancholy is analo-
gous to Wittgenstein’s grammar of pain. To describe the progress of 
Hamlet’s melancholy as a declension is to imply that melancholy has a 
particular grammar in which it is expressed and by which it is under-
stood. like the forms of the inflected noun, melancholy progresses in a 
coherent pattern: it has a kind of verbal logic that makes it intelligible. 
in representing Hamlet’s melancholy in grammatical terms, Polonius 
implicitly identifies melancholy with the form of its expression. for 
melancholy to have a grammar, a system of rules and conventions by 
which it abides, it can neither be simply a material object like black 
bile nor an abstract state of mind that subsists solely in the interior. 
it must be a public practice, extended over time and enacted in the 
world, like a spoken or written language. melancholy is thus not 
simply indicated by melancholic behavior, but inherent in it, manifest 
in the “forms, moods, shapes of grief” by which it is publically known 
(1.2.82). as Wittgenstein writes, “We do not see facial contortions and 
make the inference that he is feeling joy, grief, boredom. We describe 
a face immediately as sad, radiant, bored, even when we are unable 
to give any other description of the features.—Grief, one would like 
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to say, is personified in the face.”25 Here we find no distance between 
one’s inward state and the shows and signs that lend it material form.
i acknowledge the risk of perversity in attributing such insight to 
Polonius, a figure of fun throughout the play, and the most frequent 
object of Hamlet’s scorn. The use of the grammar school term is 
probably intended, in part at least, to suggest Polonius’s pedantry. 
but i believe that Polonius represents an exaggerated form of an idea 
that we find latent throughout the play, and even in Hamlet himself, 
despite his protestations: that inward states, far from being inexpress-
ible, are “grammatical,” structured by conventional rules and manifest 
in patterns of language and behavior. 
This perspective is represented in many of the early plays of 
Shakespeare, which often use grammatical terms to trace affective 
states and relationships. in Love’s Labour’s Lost, for instance, we find 
the heart of the lover armado declined as a noun in the ablative case 
by the servant moth, adapting a lesson from Shakespeare’s grammar 
book, William lily’s Short Introduction of Grammar: “‘by’ heart you 
love her, because your heart cannot come by her; ‘in’ heart you love 
her, because your heart is in love with her; and ‘out’ of heart you love 
her, being out of heart that you cannot enjoy her.”26 moth’s descrip-
tion of armado’s loving heart suggests that the love relationship has a 
distinctive grammar, a structure analogous to that of the sentence. if 
armado the lover is the nominative subject and his beloved Jacquenetta 
the accusative object, then the heart is the ablative instrument of their 
love, the means by which armado loves and the state in which he loves. 
love is not a thing confined to the inward space of the heart, but 
extended across the lived practice of the loving relationship, manifest 
in its words, vows, and rituals.
titus andronicus, like Hamlet, prominently features the problem 
of expression, but in titus the failure of expression is attributable to 
the physical destruction of the organs of speech rather than the divide 
between feeling and expression. observing his brother marcus with 
his arms crossed, Titus describes his own manner of mourning after 
the loss of his hand:
marcus, unknit that sorrow-wreathen knot.
Thy niece and i, poor creatures, want our hands,
and cannot passionate our tenfold grief
With folded arms. This poor right hand of mine
is left to tyrannize upon my breast,
Who, when my heart, all mad with misery,
beats in this hollow prison of my flesh,
Then thus i thump it down.27
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To “passionate” one’s grief is to give it material form in the gestures 
and motions of the body: lacking his left hand, Titus must beat his 
breast with his right in order to properly perform his sorrowful state.28 
lavinia’s ruined frame, deprived not only of its hands but of its tongue 
as well, is an even greater obstacle to articulacy, but she is neverthe-
less able to express herself in silent action. mute and mutilated, her 
very body has become a “map of woe,” manifesting its grief in the 
wounds it bears and the postures and positions it assumes (3.2.12). 
Titus pledges to train himself in her particular manner of expression, 
adopting the language of grammar school pedagogy in order to do so:
Speechless complainer, i will learn thy thought.
in thy dumb action will i be as perfect
as begging hermits in their holy prayers.
Thou shalt not sigh, nor hold thy stumps to heaven,
nor wink, nor nod, nor kneel, nor make a sign,
but i of these will wrest an alphabet,
and by still practice learn to know thy meaning. 
         (3.2.39–45)
in Titus’s account, “thought” is equivalent to “dumb action” and 
“meaning” to “alphabet”: there is no distinction between the sorrow 
lavinia feels and the gestures in which that sorrow is expressed. The 
difficulty of understanding does not result from a gulf between outward 
sign and inward feeling, but from the strange and novel language 
lavinia is forced to adopt in her maimed condition. Titus has once again 
become a student in studying this new tongue: imagining himself in the 
grammar school, he vows to learn the “alphabet” of lavinia’s passion.
Hamlet’s melancholy, armado’s love, and lavinia’s sorrow are all 
represented as possessing a particular grammar, a set of rules and 
structures by which they are rendered legible and coherent. i take 
these allusions to the discourse of the grammar school as evidence of 
a worldview profoundly influenced by Humanist pedagogy, a world-
view that, to quote bacon’s censure, is more concerned with “words 
than matter.”29 Within this worldview, the art of grammar becomes 
a paradigm of human existence and experience, roughly analogous 
to the way computer programs have come to serve as a model for 
cognition in our own day. The implications and consequences of the 
two models, however, are very different, for while the computational 
analogy leads us to conceive of the mind as abstract and interiorized, 
as software within a material frame, the language of grammar demands 
that we view human existence as an expressive and pragmatic way of 
being in the world.30
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in “fiction as ‘Grammatical’ investigation,” Schalkwyk argues that 
“it may be fruitful to regard fiction, or at least certain kinds of fiction, 
as being already engaged in the kind of “grammatical investigation” 
with which Wittgenstein was concerned in his philosophical work. if 
Wittgenstein opens the doors of philosophy to fiction, it may be that 
his kind of philosophy has long been a guest in its house.”31 literature, 
like the language jokes that held particular interest for Wittgenstein, 
provides us “with a glimpse of the way in which our sense of the world 
is embedded at the intersection of our language and our historical and 
practical being in the world.”32 it produces this insight in a variety 
of ways: “it may seriously question or disturb grammatical forms, it 
may simply expose them to view, or it may highlight them in order 
to explicitly endorse or confirm them.”33 Through its innovative and 
self-conscious uses of language, literature already engages in a method 
analogous to that of Wittgenstein: questioning, revealing, and empha-
sizing the forms and functions of language. i want to suggest that, 
owing to the centrality of grammatical study in Humanist pedagogy, 
early modern literature performs these tasks in a particularly insistent 
way. in using the terms of grammar to represent the passions of char-
acters like Hamlet and lavinia, the plays of Shakespeare emphasize 
the interdependence of inward states and the language in which they 
are expressed. 
ii. HamleT’S inexPreSSible PaSSion
Throughout much of the Shakespearean canon, the inward life of 
passion is inseparable from the outward mode of its expression. in the 
character of Hamlet, however, we find articulated with arresting and 
seductive eloquence the idea that outward expression is merely the 
garb of passion, more apt to conceal passion’s truth than to convey it. 
Passion, Hamlet claims, is precisely that which cannot be conveyed 
through language or performance: it is the definitive characteristic of 
an interiority that surpasses outward expression, that which, in Danner’s 
words, “cannot be represented, cannot be named, and therefore 
cannot be translated into the world without the taint of mediation.”34 
The language and gesture previously understood as coextensive with 
passion become shallow ostentation to Hamlet, who insists again and 
again that mere words cannot fathom his feeling, that his inner life is 
ultimately inexpressible. 
Hamlet thus moves from a rhetorical and grammatical understanding 
of the world, an understanding characteristic of sixteenth-century 
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Humanism, to a metaphysical one in which reified things assume 
priority over words. as i have suggested, this need not be taken as an 
epochal shift towards modernity: Hamlet’s perspective accords with 
the reaction against Humanism taking place at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century and with such venerable discourses as the Pauline 
language of letter and Spirit.35 it does, however, signal a shift within 
Shakespearean drama, a transition from a theater often defined by 
self-conscious displays of polished rhetoric to one characterized by 
a complex and often baroque syntax that seems to reflect “the spon-
taneous rhythms of a mind in motion.”36 The pleasure that was once 
taken in lyricism and rhetorical flourish gives way to a pronounced 
discomfort with the conventions of language that we see exemplified 
in the character of Hamlet. but the anti-rhetorical position, as russ 
mcDonald observes, is paradoxically achieved not by the rejection of 
the language arts, but through a more accomplished and sophisticated 
use of rhetoric itself.37
The exemplary case of the tension between language and inward-
ness is, of course, Hamlet’s speech in act one, scene two. His first 
extended piece of dialogue, the speech seems intended to define his 
character against the world of the court in which he moves. claudius 
and Gertrude are dismayed by what they perceive as Hamlet’s excessive 
mourning, which violates the traditionally moderated and circumscribed 
performance of grief for a lost parent. Gertrude asks why Hamlet’s 
practice of mourning “seems . . . so particular” when it is part of the 
natural order of things for a son to lose his father (1.2.75). Hamlet 
responds:
Seems madam? nay, it is. i know not ‘seems’.
’Tis not alone my inky cloak, good mother,
nor customary suits of solemn black,
nor windy suspiration of forced breath,
no, nor the fruitful river in the eye,
nor the dejected haviour of the visage,
Together with all forms, moods, shapes of grief,
That can denote me truly. These indeed ‘seem’,
for they are actions that a man might play,
but i have that within which passes show,
These but the trappings and the suits of woe. 
             (1.2.76–86)
Hamlet’s speech surveys his appearance in the wake of his father’s 
death, detailing the gestures and postures of his grief: black clothing, 
tears, labored breath, a downcast demeanor. These are the conventional 
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signs and practices that comprise what we might call the grammar of 
mourning. but for Hamlet, these practices cannot entirely “denote” his 
particular experience of sorrow. as katharine eisaman maus writes, 
the speech emphasizes the gulf “between signs (‘trappings and suits’) 
and what they signify (‘that within’).”38 The outward shows of grief 
are merely signs of an inward phenomenon that ultimately surpasses 
signification.
Though it is often read solely as a contribution to philosophy or 
intellectual history, the speech serves a number of rhetorical purposes 
in the context of the scene. it displays Hamlet’s loyalty to the memory 
of his father and offers a subtle but caustic rebuke to the hypocritical 
courtiers whose grief so quickly gave way to celebration of the new 
king’s marriage. beckwith’s reading of the speech emphasizes the 
relationship with Gertrude, suggesting Hamlet is motivated by the 
sting of his mother’s betrayal. Hamlet’s speech is “a response to a felt 
abandonment by the mother who has theatricalized his deepest feeling 
[by implying that it is mere “seeming”]. He has lost his father, and now 
apparently his mother too is vanishing from him.”39 Schalkwyk notes 
that the speech establishes Hamlet’s singularity and idiosyncrasy, casting 
him as a melancholic and moralistic figure at odds with the corrup-
tion of the court: “if losing fathers is common, then Hamlet asserts 
the uncommonness of his persistent grief in contrast to those around 
him that have been happy to turn from death to life.”40 one important 
point that is easy to overlook is the fact that Hamlet’s performance of 
grief is not minimized but exaggerated. Though the speech dismisses 
the importance of his mournful behavior, we learn from the reactions 
of the claudius and Gertrude that this behavior has been especially 
pronounced. Hamlet has violated the conventions of mourning not by 
refusing to participate in what he derides as empty ritual and ceremony, 
but by performing his grief in an especially emphatic way. calling this 
performance inadequate is in effect to emphasize it yet again: “if only 
you knew the full extent of my grief: these outward shows, extravagant 
as they are, are only the shadows of its substance.” These readings 
focus on the function of the speech rather than its referential content.
it should be noted that Hamlet never explicitly names his inward 
state, referring to it only obliquely as “that within.” Though this 
nebulous phrasing has provoked a variety of theories, both sound and 
extravagant, about what occulted thing Hamlet might harbor within 
himself, it should most likely be read as a strategy of occlusion intended 
to emphasize the inexpressibility of his sorrow.41 i want to propose 
that the missing term in Hamlet’s language is passion, conceived as 
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an inward affection opposed but intimately related to outward action. 
This specific term is implied by Hamlet’s use of the term “actions” 
to describe the outward gestures and expressions opposed to “that 
within.” “action” is a richly significant word in the speech: adjacent 
to “play,” it suggests play-acting and theatricality, the occupation of 
the stage actor. but in this context, the word also suggests a general 
metaphysical category, a mode of active being opposed to passion. This 
becomes clear when the speech is compared to contemporary discourse 
on passion and action. robert burton employs remarkably similar 
language in writing that “Weeping, Sighing, laughing . . . are motions 
of the body, depending upon these precedent motions of the minde: 
neither are tears, affections, but actions.”42 Thomas Wright makes 
the same distinction in writing that “in many externall actions may be 
discouered internall passions.”43 if the outward gestures of mourning 
and other performances of feeling are “actions” in the language of 
Shakespeare, burton, and Wright, then “that within” is perfectly aligned 
with burton’s “affections” and Wright’s “internall passions.” 
The discussions of burton and Wright rely on a binary opposition 
between passion, conceived as a passive experience or suffering, and 
action, understood as an outward performance or gesture. Passion 
and action are organized along the same lines as body and mind, and 
external and internal. according to this model, the sorrow Hamlet 
passively experiences upon the death of his father is opposed to the 
action he takes to express or convey this sorrow, such as mourning or 
weeping (though it may motivate these actions).44 Hamlet’s speech on 
the inexpressibility of his sorrow thus relies upon the formal opposi-
tion of inward passion and outward action, of the passive affections 
and impressions of the mind or soul and the actions and gestures of 
the body.
Passion and action are common terms in renaissance intellectual 
discourse, appearing as rhetorical topoi, logical oppositions, and meta-
physical categories.45 The frequency with which they appear in the text 
of Hamlet has led scholars to speak of the play’s “preoccupation with 
passion and action.”46 Shakespeare would have almost certainly first 
encountered the technical sense of the terms in his grammar lessons: 
lily defines the verb as a part of speech that “betokeneth doing: as 
amo, i love. or sufferinge: as amor, i am loved. or being: as Sum, i 
am.”47 The grammarian John brinsley makes the connection between 
passion and the passive voice yet more explicit: “a verb passive,” he 
writes, “betokeneth passion.”48 like Polonius’s description of Hamlet’s 
melancholy, then, the speech is marked by the influence of the grammar 
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school, albeit in a more subtle way. Through its explanation of the 
voice of the verb, the grammar book provides a basic model for the 
opposition of “doing” and “suffering” that may be accommodated to 
broader discourse on human agency and experience. When Hamlet, 
to cite but one example of the terms in the play, reproaches himself 
for overindulgence in passion and a consequent lack of action, he 
alludes to this model: 
Do you not come your tardy son to chide,
That, laps’d in time and passion, lets go by
Th’important acting of your dread command? 
         (3.4.107–9)
To suggest an essential distinction between what Wright calls external 
actions and internal passions is to allude to an oppositional structure 
derived from linguistic use and formalized in the traditions of grammar. 
The negative space of the interior, that which “passes show,” can only 
be constructed in opposition to the actions of the exterior. The reason 
Hamlet can darkly, yet nevertheless meaningfully, gesture towards this 
inward space is that it is already understood as the opposite of outward 
action. The passion-action antinomy allows the elided passion to be 
recognized, its space already established by the schema of grammar. 
Though the speech insists upon the inexpressibility of inward passion, 
it communicates this passion by reference to the conventional opposi-
tions of grammar: ineffability is paradoxically enabled by the structure 
of language. Hamlet’s passion, in spite of his refusal even to pronounce 
its name, abides by a particular grammar.
That Hamlet’s “that within” speech, “the locus classicus of early 
modern ‘interiority,’” draws on the language of the grammar school 
is telling evidence of the harmony of language and inwardness in the 
play.49 it is also symptomatic of a wider relationship between language 
and metaphysics, for the metaphysical categories of passion and action 
themselves, i would argue, are abstracted from linguistic use. aristotle’s 
Categories, perhaps the first systematic theorization of passion and 
action, derives the concepts from the use of passive and active verbs. 
observing that we say a thing “cuts” or “is cut,” “burns” or “is burnt,” 
aristotle derives the general categories of action and passion through 
what is essentially an exercise in descriptive grammar: “‘cuts’ or 
‘burns,’ again, indicates action [poieîn], ‘is cut’ or ‘is burnt’ a Passion 
[páschein].”50 The more familiar sense of passion as a psychological 
state is likewise abstracted from the everyday use of language: when 
a man is angry, writes aristotle, “We say ‘Such a man is affected.’ 
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Such states are passions [páthe].”51 in drawing on the language of the 
grammar school to depict the inward passions of its characters, Hamlet 
highlights the relationship between grammar and metaphysics that 
has persisted throughout the long tradition of Western philosophy.52
Though we often find Hamlet adopting an anti-rhetorical and 
anti-grammatical pose, at times he too evokes the atmosphere of the 
grammar school, especially in the antic scenes. The first encounter 
with the ghost features both of these positions and demonstrates the 
tension between them. Upon meeting with this truly transcendent 
being, a thing undreamt of in the philosophy of the age, Hamlet swears 
to put behind him the learning of his youth:
 remember thee?
ay, thou poor ghost, whiles memory holds a seat
in this distracted globe. remember thee?
yea, from the table of my memory
i’ll wipe away all trivial fond records,
all saws of books, all forms, all pressures past
That youth and observation copied there,
and thy commandment alone shall live
Within the book and volume of my brain,
Unmix’d with baser matter. 
     (1.5.95–104)
Here it seems the commonplaces and sententiae of Humanist pedagogy 
have been rendered irrelevant by a being beyond human comprehen-
sion. The existence of the ghost demands a radical revaluation of all 
learning: it is a thing of which no word can give an adequate account. 
but immediately upon the pronouncement of this vow against learning, 
Hamlet turns to his tables to record a commonplace learned from 
the ghost’s tale: “my tables. meet it is i set it down / That one may 
smile, and smile, and be a villain” (1.5.107–108). in the collaborative 
article “Hamlet’s Tables,” Peter Stallybrass, roger chartier, J. franklin 
mowery, and Heather Wolfe note the irony that a play based upon an 
earlier version of the Hamlet story would evince such hostility towards 
the tradition of commonplacing: “While Hamlet scorns the audience’s 
table-books in Q1, the scripts through which he comes into existence are 
themselves the products of writing tables and commonplace books.”53 
The irony is emphasized by Hamlet’s reference to the “book and 
volume of my brain” (1.5.103). even the vow to forswear the practices 
of Humanism, then, suggests how deeply the methods and materials 
of learning are embedded in early modern discourse, providing the 
vocabulary in which thought and memory are conceptualized.
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When Horatio and the guards reenter the scene, Hamlet begins to 
adopt that performance of madness he calls his “antic disposition,” and 
the reverence and awe he had displayed towards the ghost suddenly 
gives way to wry mockery (1.5.180). as Hamlet asks the assembled 
witnesses to swear to conceal what they have seen, the ghost echoes 
his request, repeatedly calling out “Swear” from below the stage. 
each of these commands is met with an impertinent reply from 
Hamlet, beginning with “ah ha, boy, say’st though so? art thou there, 
truepenny? come on, you hear this fellow in the cellarage. consent to 
swear” (1.5.158–160). in addition to their surprisingly jocular quality 
given Hamlet’s usual veneration of his father, the lines are noteworthy 
for the way they draw attention to the theatrical situation. The refer-
ence to the ghost as a “fellow in the cellarage” reveals him to be an 
actor crouching beneath the floor of the stage rather than a spirit 
journeying back to Purgatory. (coleridge, in his only criticism of the 
play’s artistry, found this scene “hardly defensible”).54 Hamlet’s name 
for the ghost, “truepenny,” is a reference to Tom Truepenny, the loyal 
servant figure from Ralph Roister Doister, a sixteenth-century comedy 
by the schoolmaster nicholas Udall intended for performance in the 
grammar school.55 The reference recalls the pedagogical culture that 
featured prominently in Shakespeare’s early comedy.
This drily ironic and self-consciously theatrical performance is 
punctuated by a simple latin tag: “Hic et ubique?”, Hamlet asks in 
regard to the ghost’s seemingly ubiquitous presence (1.5.164). The 
phrase has no definite origin, but scholars have proposed a number 
of possible sources, typically invoking theological and devotional 
traditions.56 Stephen Greenblatt—suggesting that the phrase recalls 
the discourse of Purgatory, clearly relevant to the scenes with the 
ghost—cites a prayer for the dead that was part of the ritual practice 
of catholic england: “avete, omnes animae fideles, quarum corpora 
hic et ubique requiescunt in pulvere” [Hail all faithful souls, whose 
bodies here and everywhere do rest in the dust] .57 in addition to this 
echo of catholic devotional practice, Greenblatt also notes that the 
phrase would have suggested “that Hamlet, like his friend Horatio, is 
something of a scholar.”58 but in an age of latin learning, one would 
hardly need to be a scholar to articulate such a simple expression. 
i believe the phrase would have recalled the basic exercises of the 
grammar school rather than the kind of scholarship one would associate 
with Wittenberg.59 between the reference to Udall’s grammar school 
play, the echo of schoolboy latin, and the generally irreverent tone 
of the scene, we might be led to consider Hamlet’s “antic disposition” 
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as a kind of schoolboy demeanor, an attitude prone to wordplay and 
self-consciousness of the kind prevalent in the early comedies. This 
attitude is in dramatic contrast with the seriousness of the vow to put 
away childish things that Hamlet pronounces upon the ghost’s initial 
departure. by dryly describing the otherworldly presence of the ghost 
in the terms of the schoolroom, the text emphasizes the tension in the 
play between the ineffable and the ordinary.
iii. beinG, SUfferinG, acTinG
Hamlet’s “To be or not to be” soliloquy—almost certainly the best-
known passage in Shakespeare, and perhaps all of english literature—
raises once again the question of passion and action, and once again 
recalls the language of the schoolroom. The speech appears during 
the execution of Hamlet’s plan to expose the king’s guilt by means 
of the play, though it seems to have little dramatic bearing on the 
events that surround it. Performed between the resolution to stage 
the play and the instructions to the players, the speech is a moment 
of contemplation and reflection that interrupts the course of Hamlet’s 
most pragmatic activity: 
To be or not to be, that is the question:
Whether ’tis nobler in the mind to suffer
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,
or to take arms against a sea of troubles
and by opposing end them. 
          (3.1.56–60)
Despite the reference to “the question,” the speech actually raises two 
questions, two rhetorical topoi of the kind debated in the schools. The 
first of the two—“To be or not to be”—is descended from the ques-
tion of whether an unhappy life is better than none at all. as Harold 
Jenkins observes, this was a traditional topic for dialectical argument, 
and augustine’s discussion of it in De libero arbitrio closely anticipates 
the language of the speech: “it is not because i would rather be unhappy 
than not be at all, that i am unwilling to die, but for fear that after 
death i may be still more unhappy” (quoted in 3.1.56–88n). The second 
question—whether it is nobler “to suffer” or “to take arms”—concerns 
the opposition of passion and action, which as we have already seen 
is one of the play’s preoccupations. critics have associated this ques-
tion with the long tradition of ethical debate on the opposed virtues 
of patient endurance and active valor.60 Proposing such topics gives 
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the speech “the structure of a formal academic debate,” recalling the 
traditions of Humanist pedagogy.61
The precise relationship between these two questions is ambiguous 
and has provoked considerable critical argument. The second question 
is presented as a gloss or restatement of the first, but the opposed 
terms under consideration in the questions—being and not being in 
the first, suffering and acting in the second—are not easy to reconcile 
with one another. The order of the terms as they are presented would 
associate being with suffering and not being with acting, contrary to 
our likely expectations. as being is typically taken for human life or 
existence, it should imply a kind of activity. Some have claimed that 
this must be the case, and that the order of the terms is simply inverted 
in the second statement.62 but the simplest reading equates being 
with suffering: as Jenkins puts it, “the alternatives are to ‘suffer’ or to 
‘end’, to endure or to die; and these are what the body of the speech 
discusses” (3.1.56–88n). being is thus represented as perpetual suffer-
ance: to be is to endure the slights, oppressions, and disappointments 
of life in an ongoing exercise of “patient merit” (3.1.74). 
in elaborating this view, the speech moves from the broad and 
abstract terms of the opening lines to an intimately detailed, if jaun-
diced, account of lived experience, enumerating such hardships as the 
frailties of the body, the injustices inflicted by the great, the frustrations 
of legal process, and the disappointments of love. one’s only available 
relief within this darkly inflected worldview, in which life is merely 
a succession of hardships and failures, is self-slaughter or a show of 
vain resistance that leads inevitably to death. Thus “end” bears a bitter 
double meaning: to end one’s troubles is not to overcome them, but to 
confront them in an act of futile heroism that will end one’s troubles 
and one’s life by the same stroke. in its uncompromising refusal to 
accept the injustices and indignities of the world, the speech is poised 
between defiance and despair. Significant for our purposes is the way 
the speech represents a variety of forms of life and ways of engaging 
with the world, drawing evocative if economical portraits of the disap-
pointed lover, the humiliated servant, the petitioner denied access to 
justice. These scenes of humble, ordinary existence stand in contrast 
with the exalted abstractions with which the speech begins.
in addition to the resemblance to augustine, critics have noted 
echoes of Plato, cicero, Plutarch, and montaigne in the speech.63 
aristotle’s discussion of “being and not being” in the metaphysics—
perhaps filtered through marlowe’s Doctor Faustus, which quotes the 
Greek “on cai me on”—is often cited as an influence.64 i would like 
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to propose an additional source for the speech, a humble one amidst 
this philosophical pantheon, which has thus far gone unnoticed: lily’s 
lesson in the infinitive: “The infinitive signifieth to do, to suffer, or to 
be.”65 lily’s “to do,” “to suffer,” and “to be” anticipate Hamlet’s “To be,” 
“to suffer,” and “to take arms” with considerable precision. it would 
be too much to say that the speech’s opening is a direct adaptation of 
lily, but given the frequency with which Shakespeare cites lily and 
the close resemblance of the terms it seems likely that the lesson was 
at least echoing in Shakespeare’s memory when he composed the lines. 
The nature of human being, agency, and passivity expressed and 
elaborated with such eloquence in the speech may thus be traced to a 
simple lesson in verbal voice. The echo of lily shows that the abstract 
terms with which the soliloquy opens, which have lead many critics to 
associate the speech with various metaphysical schema, are not only 
“modes of being” but also ways of speaking (3.1.57–60n). The meta-
physical categories of being, action, and passion are abstracted from 
grammatical positions: as we have seen, aristotle derives the categories 
of poieîn and páschein from the fact that we say a thing does or suffers, 
and the first category—ousía, “substance” or “essence”—is abstracted 
from the statement that a thing is (as Wittgenstein writes, “Essence is 
expressed in grammar.”)66 That the background of Shakespeare’s most 
“philosophical” speech runs backward through aristotle and Plato to his 
adolescent training in grammar seems an apt allegory for this process, 
vividly representing the way that the concepts of philosophy emerge 
from the everyday uses of language.
as Peter Hacker writes, capacities such as reason, deliberation, and 
memory—though we may attribute them to animals in a rudimentary 
or attenuated form—“presuppose possession of a language. The limits 
of thought and knowledge… are the limits of the possible expression 
of thought and knowledge.”67 To act and to understand ourselves as 
temporal beings, for instance, we must have a grammar of tempo-
rality, or tense: it is “the use of a tensed language and of devices for 
temporal reference, that constitutes the primary criteria for ascribing 
to a creature knowledge, memory, thought, and belief involving such 
reference to the past or future.”68 our sense of temporality is predi-
cated on the fact that our language is a tensed language, for only by the 
mechanism of tense may we speak of what is, and was, and is to come. 
Without a tensed language, we would exist in time, but we would not 
be able to plan for the future, to ruminate on some distant memory, 
or—by means of the future anterior tense that so intrigued those in 
the Heideggerean tradition—to project ourselves into the future and 
consider what we will have been.
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Just as temporality relies upon tense, the portrait of human agency 
and passion on display in Hamlet’s speech is dependent upon the 
mechanism of verbal voice, the ability of active and passive grammars 
to express the position of the subject as one who acts or suffers in the 
world. Shakespeare’s “dance of human passions” relies upon passive 
grammar to express that one is stricken by “The pangs of dispriz’d 
love” (3.1.72), stymied by “the law’s delay” (3.1.72), or compelled to 
endure “the proud man’s contumely” (3.1.71).69 The suffering of the 
subject in these constructions is manifest in the structure of language. 
in prefacing its detailed narrative of lived experience with paradigmatic 
verbal forms (“to be,” “to suffer,” “to stand against”) that echo the 
grammar book, the speech invites us to consider, to cite Schalkwyk 
again, “the intersection of our language and our historical and practical 
being in the world.” in this way, the speech constitutes something 
like a “grammatical investigation”: its rumination on being, suffering, 
and acting is an exploration of the power of grammar to express these 
concepts and an arresting reminder of the harmony of language and 
worldly existence.
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